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I.

Introduction
A legal regime of several counter-terrorism conventions

provides a legal framework for the international war on terror.1
The most important aspect of this international legal regime is
the commitment of states to bring terrorists to justice by
prosecuting them or extraditing them to countries willing and
able to prosecute.2

As part of this commitment to extradite or

prosecute terrorists, states have agreed to investigate and if
appropriate arrest suspected terrorists found within their
territory.3

If countries fail to investigate alleged terrorists,

or fail to prosecute or extradite them when their investigations
yield incriminating evidence, the counter-terrorism legal regime
will become obsolete.4

The war on terror will lose an important

international law ally, and distrust and lack of cooperation
among states will likely take its place.5
The dispute between Venezuela and the United States over
the extradition of alleged terrorist Luis Posada Carriles poses
a challenge to the reliability and effectiveness of the counterterrorism regime.6

Posada Carriles, a Cuban-born anti-Castro

militant with a long history of violent acts against Cuban
interests in Latin America, entered the United States illegally
in March, 2005.7

On June 15, 2005, Venezuela filed a request for

his extradition, citing as legal basis the 1923 United StatesVenezuela Extradition Treaty, the 1971 Montreal Convention for
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the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (“Montreal Convention”), and the 1998 Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (“Terrorist Bombings
Convention”).8

Venezuela wants to try Posada Carriles, a

naturalized Venezuelan, for the 1976 bombing of a Cuban civil
aircraft over Barbados, which took the lives of 73 people.9
The Department of State forwarded Venezuela’s extradition
request to the Department of Justice’s Office of International
Affairs (OIA) as early as September 8, 2005.10
has not yet acted on the request.11

The OIA, however,

Neither the Department of

State nor the Department of Justice (DOJ) has communicated with
Venezuela regarding Posada Carriles’ extradition, despite
repeated claims by Venezuela that the United States is ignoring
the request and harboring a terrorist.12
On May 17, 2005, officers of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) detained Posada Carriles and initiated
deportation proceedings against him.13

Posada Carriles accepted

his deportability before an immigration court, but moved for
deferral of removal to Venezuela, arguing that he would suffer
torture in Venezuela if the DHS deported him to this country.14
On September 26, immigration judge William L. Abbott found that
Posada Carriles more likely than not would face torture in
Venezuela.15

The United States has an obligation under the

Convention against Torture to refrain from deporting or
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extraditing persons to countries where they may suffer torture
or inhumane treatment.16
motion.17

Judge Abbott granted Posada Carriles’

The DHS’ Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

is currently looking for a country other than Venezuela where to
deport Posada Carriles.18
This comment explores the obligations of the United States
under the Montreal Convention and Terrorist Bombings Convention
in the case of Posada Carriles.

Part II presents the relevant

provisions of these conventions and summarizes the extradition
law and procedure of the United States.19

Part III (a) argues

that both the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions apply
in this case.20

Part III (b) proposes that the United States has

a duty to investigate expeditiously Venezuela’s allegations that
Posada Carriles masterminded the 1976 bombing of the Cuban
aircraft, and to report promptly the results of the
investigation to Venezuela.21

Part III (c) argues that the

removal proceedings against Posada Carriles do not satisfy the
United States’ duty to investigate.22

Finally, part III (d)

concludes that the United States has failed to conduct the
expeditious investigation that the Montreal and Terrorist
Bombings conventions require.23
The United States should take prompt actions to investigate
Venezuela’s allegations and inform Venezuela of the results of
the investigation.24

This comment predicts that if the United
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States fails to take these actions, it will also violate the
duty to extradite or prosecute.25

The United States should

codify the duty to investigate and report to avoid future
violations.26

If the United States fails to investigate

Venezuela’s allegations and, if appropriate, extradite or
prosecute Posada Carriles, the international community will lose
confidence in the counter-terrorism regime, rendering it mostly
ineffective.27
II.
a.

Background
International Obligations
Both the United States and Venezuela are parties to the

Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings Convention.28

The

Montreal Convention became enforceable between the two states in
November, 1983.29

The Terrorist Bombings Convention became

enforceable between them in September, 2003.30
The Montreal Convention makes it an international crime to
destroy or attempt to destroy civil aircrafts in service.31

The

Terrorist Bombings Convention criminalizes violent attacks
against places of public use, including public transportation
systems.32

Public transportation systems include places,

conveyances and instrumentalities used to deliver transportation
services to the public.33
Both the Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings
Convention require states to establish jurisdiction over the
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covered offences when the alleged perpetrator is present in
their territory.34

They also obligate states to investigate

allegations that an offender is present in their territory, and
to report the results of the investigation to states with
jurisdiction over the offender.35
Offences under these conventions constitute extraditable
crimes.36

Both instruments direct states to consider the

offences incorporated into all existing extradition agreements
among them, and to include the offences as extraditable crimes
in all of their future extradition agreements.37

The conventions

require states to extradite alleged offenders or submit their
cases to domestic authorities for the purpose of prosecution.38
The Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions also impose a
duty upon the parties to provide one another “the greatest
measure of assistance” in investigations and proceedings against
suspected offenders.39
The United States and Venezuela are also parties to the
Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (“Inter-American
Convention”).40

The Inter-American Convention became enforceable

between them on November 2, 2005.41

The Inter-American

Convention obligates states “to afford one another the greatest
measure of expeditious mutual legal assistance” in the
investigation and prosecution of offences under the Montreal
Convention and Terrorist Bombings Convention.42
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b.

United States Law
Federal courts have jurisdiction to try terrorists who

commit acts of violence against civil aircrafts, regardless of
the terrorist’s nationality and where the offence takes place.43
The United States, however, does not have to exercise
jurisdiction in every case.44

The United States may extradite

the suspect to a country with stronger relations to the suspect
or the crime.45
The United States receives extradition requests through the
Department of State.46

The Department of State determines

whether a legal basis exists for the extradition and whether the
documents submitted meet all applicable formalities.47

The

Department of State then forwards the request to the OIA.48

The

OIA reviews the request to determine whether the evidence
supports probable cause to believe that the person subject to
the request committed the offence for which the requesting state
seeks extradition.49

If the OIA considers that enough evidence

exists to support a probable cause finding, it brings
extradition proceedings before a United States magistrate in the
district where the person subject to the extradition request is
present.50

The magistrate conducts a probable cause inquiry and

revises any pertinent provisions of the relevant extradition
agreement to decide whether the person is extraditable.51

If the

magistrate finds the person extraditable, she certifies the
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decision to the Department of State.52

The Department of State

makes the final determination whether to extradite the person.

53

Countries can raise allegations that a person who has
committed an offence under the Montreal Convention or the
Terrorist Bombings Convention is present in the United States by
means other than a formal request for extradition.54

Thus, in

different situations other government offices may be in charge
of conducting the investigation and providing the report that
the conventions require.55

However, when a request for

extradition is the conduit that a foreign country chooses to
raise an allegation that a terrorist is in the United States,
the OIA is the body which domestic law charges with the
investigation of the allegations raised.56

The OIA must inquire

into the substance of the allegations and determine whether to
honor the extradition request by bringing extradition
proceedings before a United States magistrate.57
The law does not impose an obligation on the OIA to process
extradition requests in an expeditious manner or within a
specific time period.58

The OIA may process an extradition

request within days of having received the request from the
Department of State or may take years to initiate extradition
proceedings.59
III.

Analysis
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a.

The Montreal and Terrorist Bombings Conventions Apply to
the Case of the Extradition of Posada Carriles
The 1976 bombing of the Cuban airplane falls within the

scope of the Montreal Convention.60

Violent attacks against

civil aircrafts constitute the specific object of this
instrument.61

The downing of the Cuban airplane also falls

within the scope of the Terrorist Bombings Convention.62

The

Terrorist Bombings Convention covers violent attacks against
public transportation systems.63

A public transportation system

includes conveyances and instrumentalities used in
transportation services available to the public.64

A civil

airplane engaged in the transportation of members of the public,
as was the Cuban airplane in this case, is an instrumentality
and thus part of a public transportation system.65
Both the Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings
Convention apply to the case of Posada Carriles even though the
offence for which Venezuela wants to try Posada Carriles
occurred before the conventions became enforceable between the
United States and Venezuela.66
apply retroactively.67

Extradition treaties generally

The Montreal and Terrorist Bombings

conventions focus on extradition as a means of bringing
terrorists to justice.68 The central provisions of the
conventions focus on making the covered offences extraditable
crimes and facilitating the extradition of offenders.69
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States

must consider the covered offences incorporated in all
extradition treaties in force between them and must include the
offences as extraditable crimes in all of their future
extradition agreements.70

States must also extradite or

prosecute alleged offenders.71

Because the conventions’ main

objective and central provisions deal with extradition as a
means of fighting terrorism, and extradition agreements
generally apply to offences which took place before the
agreements’ date of entry into force, the Montreal Convention
and Terrorist Bombings Convention apply to Venezuela’s
extradition request.72
b.

The Duty to Investigate and Report Requires the United
States to Undertake an Expeditiousness Investigation and
Make a Prompt Report in the Case of Posada Carriles
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that

treaty interpretation should focus on the plain meaning of the
treaty’s terms in light of the treaty’s objectives, and should
take into account other rules of international law binding upon
the parties in dispute.73

The objective of the Montreal

Convention and Terrorist Bombings Convention is to deter
terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice.74

The Inter-

American Convention obliges the United States and Venezuela to
provide one another expeditious assistance in the investigation
of offences under the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings
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conventions.75

The language of the Montreal and Terrorist

Bombings conventions, read in light of the conventions’
objective and the United States’ duty of expeditious assistance
under the Inter-American Convention, supports the interpretation
that the United States must conduct an expeditious investigation
of Venezuela’s charges against Posada Carriles and promptly
inform Venezuela of the investigation’s results.76
The objective of the Montreal Convention and Terrorist
Bombings Convention is to deter and prevent future acts of
terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice.77

An expeditious

investigation of Venezuela’s charges against Posada Carriles is
necessary to further this objective.78

Failure by the United

States to conduct an expeditious investigation would show lack
of resolve in bringing terrorists to justice.79

Such a failure

would run afoul the objective of the conventions.80
The Inter-American Convention requires the United States
and Venezuela to extend one another “the greatest measure of
expeditious mutual legal assistance” in connection with
investigations of offences under the Montreal and Terrorist
Bombings conventions.81

This obligation, as a rule of

international law binding upon the United States and Venezuela,
informs the interpretation of the Montreal and Terrorist
Bombings conventions as they apply between Venezuela and the
United States.82

The duty to afford one another expeditious
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assistance in bringing terrorists to justice effectively adds a
requirement of expeditiousness to the duty to investigate and
report of the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions.83
The language of the Montreal Convention supports the
conclusion that the duty to investigate and report requires the
United States to conduct an expeditious investigation and make a
prompt report in the case of Posada Carriles.84

The Montreal

Convention directs states to “immediately make a preliminary
enquiry into the facts” whenever they have reasons to believe
that a terrorist may be present within their territory.85

The

provisions also mandate that the state conducting the
investigation “promptly report its findings” to states with
jurisdiction over the alleged terrorist.86

The use of the terms

“immediately” and “promptly” to qualify the actions that states
must take strongly suggests a duty to undertake these actions
expeditiously.87

When read with the objective of the convention

in mind, and considering the obligation of the United States to
afford Venezuela expeditious assistance under the Inter-American
Convention, this language supports the interpretation that the
duty to investigate and report requires the United States to
conduct an expeditious investigation and make a prompt report to
Venezuela.88
The Terrorist Bombings Convention provides that upon
obtaining information that an alleged terrorist is within their
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territory, states must “take such measures as may be necessary
under its domestic law” to investigate the information.89

This

language does not contain specific terms suggesting an
obligation to investigate expeditiously.90

However, unless the

duty to investigate contains a requirement of expeditiousness,
the United States could unnecessarily prolong the conclusion of
the investigation.91

This would show unwillingness to bring

terrorists to justice, thus defeating the objective of the
convention.92

With this in mind, and considering the United

States’ duty of expeditious assistance under the Inter-American
Convention, it is reasonable to interpret the Terrorist Bombings
Convention’s duty to investigate as requiring the United States
to undertake an expeditious investigation of Venezuela’s charges
against Posada Carriles.93
The obligation to report appears in the Terrorist Bombings
Convention in almost the same terms as the equivalent provision
in the Montreal Convention.94

The Terrorist Bombings Convention

provides that states must “promptly inform” other interested
parties about the results of the investigation.95

The convention

therefore obligates the United States to report promptly the
findings of the investigation to Venezuela.96
c.

The Removal Proceedings against Posada Carriles Do Not
Satisfy The Duty to Investigate and Report in the Case of
Posada Carriles
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The immigration proceedings which the DHS brought against
Posada Carriles do not satisfy the duty to investigate and
report.97

In the removal proceedings against Posada Carriles the

immigration court considered only whether Posada Carriles would
suffer torture in Venezuela.98

The court did not investigate

Venezuela’s allegations that Posada Carriles masterminded the
1976 terrorist attack, as the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings
conventions require.99
The immigration court’s decision that the Torture
Convention prevented Posada Carriles’ deportation to Venezuela
has no binding effect on the pending extradition request.100

The

immigration court’s decision does not prevent the OIA from
investigating Venezuela’s allegations and processing the
extradition request.101
d.

The United States is in Violation of the Duty to
Investigate and Report
The OIA is in charge of investigating the allegations that

Venezuela raised in the request for the extradition of Posada
Carriles.102

However, the broad discretion that the OIA enjoys

in processing extradition requests is causing the United States
to violate its duty to investigate and report in an expeditious
manner.103

Venezuela’s extradition request is pending at the OIA

while the DHS is looking for a country other than Venezuela
where to send Posada Carriles.104
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If the DHS deports Posada

Carriles, the United States will lose jurisdiction over him.105
This means that the United States will lose the opportunity to
prosecute or extradite Posada Carriles to a country willing and
able to prosecute.106

Since the objective of investigating

Venezuela’s allegations is to decide whether Posada Carriles
should face justice in Venezuela, undergo prosecution in the
United States, or go free, investigating Venezuela’s allegations
after Posada Carriles’ deportation will not serve the purpose of
the duty to investigate and report.107

The fact that the United

States may lose jurisdiction over Posada Carriles while the
extradition request is pending at the OIA shows that the OIA’s
timing in investigating Venezuela’s allegations is at odds with
the duty to investigate and report in an expeditious manner.108
IV.

Recommendations
The United States needs to take prompt action to

investigate the allegations that Venezuela raised in the request
for the extradition of Posada Carriles.109

The OIA should

immediately undertake to process Venezuela’s extradition
request.110

The DOJ or the Department of State needs to

communicate with Venezuela and give Venezuela assurances that
the OIA is investigating the allegations.111

Failure to take

these actions may result in violation of the duty to extradite
or prosecute under both the Montreal Convention and Terrorist
Bombings Convention.112

United States law should require the OIA
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to process extradition requests in an expeditious manner when
the requesting country raises the Montreal Convention or the
Terrorist Bombings Convention as legal grounds for the
extradition.113
a.

The United States Should Immediately Investigate
Venezuela’s allegations and Communicate to Venezuela the
Results of the Investigation
The OIA needs to take prompt action to process Venezuela’s

extradition request.

Processing Venezuela’s request will

necessarily involve investigating the allegations that Posada
Carriles participated in the 1976 bombing of the Cuban
airplane.114

This action will bring the United States into

compliance with the duty to investigate Venezuela’s charges
against Posada Carriles.115
The DOJ or the Department of State should promptly
communicate with Venezuela and give Venezuela assurances that
the OIA is investigating the allegations raised in the
extradition request.116

The DOJ or the Department of State

should also inform Venezuela of the results of the investigation
as soon as the OIA completes the investigation.117

Moreover, if

the OIA brings extradition proceedings in court, the DOJ or the
Department of State should promptly communicate to Venezuela the
extradition magistrate’s decision whether or not to certify
Posada Carriles as extraditable.118 This series of
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communications, along with the OIA’s actual investigation of the
extradition request, would bring the United States back into
compliance with the duty to investigate and report under the
Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions.119
b.

Failure to Take Prompt Action May Cause the United States
to be in Violation of the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute
Undertaking to process Venezuela’s extradition request

without delay will not only bring the United States into
compliance with the duty to investigate and report but may also
avoid causing the United States to be in violation of the duty
to extradite or prosecute under the Montreal and Terrorist
Bombings conventions.120

If the DHS deports Posada Carriles in

the absence of a finding by the OIA that the charges against him
lack evidentiary support, the United States would have let an
alleged terrorist go free without first establishing that the
allegations against him are unfounded.121

This is precisely what

the duty to extradite or prosecute, together with the duty to
investigate and report, seeks to avoid.122

If the DHS deports

Posada Carriles in the absence of an investigation confirming
that the allegations against him lack merit, the United States
will violate the duty to prosecute or extradite.123
c.

The United States Should Codify the Duty to Investigate
and Report to Prevent Future Violations
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The United States should implement legislation that
requires the OIA to investigate expeditiously allegations raised
in extradition requests when the requesting country invokes the
Montreal Convention or the Terrorist Bombings Convention as
legal grounds.124

Such legislation should also require the OIA

to communicate promptly the results of the investigation to the
requesting state.125

In the alternative, the United States may

charge a federal office other than the OIA with undertaking the
required investigation and report in an expeditious manner.126
The implementation of legislation in either form would likely
expedite the investigation and report of terror suspects and
eliminate unnecessary delays that may cause the United States to
violate its obligation to investigate and report in the
future.127
V.

Conclusion
The case of the extradition of Posada Carriles could

undermine the effectiveness of the international counterterrorism regime.128

The United States has failed to act

expeditiously to investigate Venezuela’s allegations of
terrorism against Posada Carriles.129

If the United States,

which has emerged as a leader in the worldwide struggle against
terrorism, fails to investigate these allegations, the
international community may lose confidence in the legitimacy of
the United States’ efforts to bring terrorists to justice.130
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This could create a state of distrust and lack of cooperation
detrimental to the success of the war on terror.131
1

See generally Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful

Seizure of Aircraft, art. I, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860
U.N.T.S. 105 (making the unlawful seizure of aircraft an
international crime); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation [hereinafter Montreal
Convention], art. I, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S
177 (proscribing violent attacks against civil aircrafts or
persons within with the intent to cause death, bodily harm or
destruction); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, art. II, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 13
I.L.M 41 (criminalizing killings, kidnappings, assaults and
other forms of violence against internationally protected
persons and their official premises, private accommodations and
means of transportation); International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, art. I, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081,
18 I.L.M 1456 (prohibiting the seizure of persons with the
intent to compel a third party, particularly a state or
international organization, to do or abstain from doing any
acts); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence
at Airports Serving Civil Aviation, art. II, Feb. 24, 1988, S.
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Treaty Doc. No. 100-19, 27 I.L.M 627 (criminalizing acts of
violence against facilities of airports serving international
civil aviation or persons within); Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, art. III, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668 (making
unlawful seizures or attacks against ships an international
crime); Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, art. II, Dec. 9, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/109, 39 I.L.M.
270 (making financing of terrorism an international crime);
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
[hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention], art. II, Jan. 9,
1998, 1998 U.S.T. Lexis 204, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164
(criminalizing unlawful use of explosive or lethal substances
against places of public use or persons within); Inter-American
Convention against Terrorism [hereinafter Inter-American
Convention], art. I and II, June 3, 2002, AG Res. 1840, OAS AG,
32nd Sess., OAS Doc. XXXII-O/02 (providing a comprehensive
framework for regional cooperation in combating terrorism).

See

also Christopher C. Joyner, International Extradition and Global
Terrorism:

Bringing International Criminals to Justice, 25 Loy.

L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 493,539 (2003) (contending that while
there is not an integrated counter-terrorism legal system, the
existing counter-terrorism conventions form a framework for
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international cooperation in the suppression and prosecution of
terrorism).
2

See Ayaz R. Shaikh, A Theoretic Approach to Transnational

Terrorism, 80 Geo. L.J. 2131, 2159 (1992) (arguing that because
the goal of the counter-terrorism conventions is the prosecution
of terrorists, a central tenet of the conventions is the
principle aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute));
John P. Grant, Terrorism on Trial:

Beyond the Montreal

Convention, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 453, 457-58 (2005)
(expressing that the duty to extradite or prosecute is the core
obligation, the cornerstone, and the most important common area
of the counter-terrorism conventions); Joyner, supra note 1, at
539-40 (referring to the extradite-or-prosecute formula as a
preeminent obligation at the heart of the counter-terrorism
conventions); John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission
of International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal
Prosecution, Harv. Hum. Rts. J., Spring 1999, at 3 (noting that
in many anti-terrorism conventions the emphasis on the duty to
prosecute or extradite is strong).

See generally M. Cherif

Bassiouni and Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare:

The Duty

to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law Pt. I, § 6
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) (arguing that the duty to
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extradite or prosecute is a rule of customary international law
and a jus cogens rule).
3

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI (imposing a duty

on states parties to investigate any information alleging the
presence of a terrorist within their territories); Terrorist
Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (establishing the
same obligation).

See also Grant, supra note 2 (expressing that

the duty to extradite or prosecute requires investigating
allegations of terrorism).
4

See Grant, supra note 2, at 458 (suggesting that unless states

undertake to prosecute or extradite in good faith, the
obligation to prosecute or extradite may become only a façade of
justice); Joyner, supra note 1, at 539-40 (proposing that the
critical ingredient for the success of the anti-terrorism regime
is political will to convert international obligations into
practice).

Professor Joyner further contends that unless

governments are willing to cooperate in suppressing terrorism,
the legal regime fails as an option. Id.
5

See Joyner, supra note 1, at 540 (noting that governments are

very receptive to domestic and international political
pressures, and in a world of conflicting political, ideological,
and economic situations, governments will find it difficult to
mobilize the domestic political will to make the international
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anti-terrorism regime work properly).

See also George B.

Newhouse Jr., The Long Arm of the Law, 25 L.A. Law. 32, 34
(observing that when a requested state fails to honor a foreign
extradition request due to lack of political will, the
requesting state may, out of frustration, use confrontational
tactics such as kidnapping the wanted person).
6

See Unwelcome Visitor, Fort Worth Star Telegram, May 19, 2005,

at B (proposing that allowing Posada Carriles to stay in the
United States or giving him free passage to another country will
make a mockery of the United States’ stance on terrorism and
seriously jeopardize America’s credibility); Curt Anderson,
Anti-Castro Militant Creates Dilemma For Washington.

U.S.

Credibility Comes Under Challenge, Tampa Trib., June 13, 2005,
at Metro (quoting Peter Kornbluh, director of the Cuba program
of the National Security Archive Research Organization at George
Washington University, stating that Posada Carriles’ presence in
the United States threatens to undermine the credibility of
American foreign policy in the war on terror); text accompanying
note 4 (suggesting that failure to prosecute or extradite terror
suspects will undermine the effectiveness of the international
anti-terrorism regime).
7

See Cronologia de Actividades de Posada Carriles, El Universal,

May 17, 2005, at Nacional y Politica, available at
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http://buscador.eluniversal.com/2005/09/28/pol_ava_28A615407.sht
ml (offering a chronology of Posada Carriles’ militant
activities, which include attempting to blow up a Cuban or
Soviet ship in the Mexican port of Veracruz in 1965; bombing a
Cuban civil aircraft over Barbados in 1976, although Posada
Carriles denies any involvement in this act; carrying out a
series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997; and attempting to
assassinate Fidel Castro in Panama in 2000, for which he was
convicted and served four years in prison).

In 2004, then-

Panamanian president Mireya Moscoso granted Posada Carriles
presidential pardon. Id.

See Peter Kornbluh, A Safe Harbor for

Luis Posada Carriles, NACLA Rep. on Am., Jan. 1, 2006, available
at 2006 WLNR 525091 (commenting that Posada Carriles entered the
country with a false passport hoping to obtain political
asylum).
8

See Wayne S. Smith, Sheltering Terrorists, Sun Sentinel (Fort

Lauderdale), Oct. 27, 2005, at 27A (showing doubt that the
United States will seriously entertain the extradition of Posada
Carriles, and predicting that he will be in custody for some
time under charges of illegal entry and then set free); Roraima
Albornoz, Wanted Terrorist Luis Posasa Carriles:

U.S.A. Offered

no Discretion Under the Law!, VHeadline.com, January 24, 2006,
available at http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=47748
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(reporting that in a statement the Venezuelan embassy in the
United States expressed that the Bush administration had no
option under the Montreal Convention but to extradite or
prosecute Posada Carriles).
9

See In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-708, U.S.

Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 5, available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (observing that Posada Carriles stood
trial in Venezuela and the court acquitted him of plotting the
bombing of the Cuban airplane).

An appeals court, however,

overturned this decision and ordered retrial after finding that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case.

Id. Posada

Carriles escaped from prison when retrial was pending. Id.
10

See Venezuela Reclama a EEUU Extradicion del “Bin Laden

Latinoamericano”, El Universal, Sept. 28, 2005, at Nacional y
Politica, available at
http://buscador.eluniversal.com/2005/09/28/pol_ava_28A615407.sht
ml (quoting the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States
saying that the Department of State sent the extradition request
to the Justice Department for processing, but the Justice
Department chose to store the request in a drawer instead of
bringing extradition proceedings before a judge).
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11

See Security Council Briefed by Chairmen of Three Anti-

Terrorism Committees; Strengthening Cooperating, Assistance to
States Among Issues Raised, U.S. Fed. News, Feb. 21, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 3089853 (reporting the remarks of
Venezuela’s diplomat Fermin Toro Jimenez before the U.N.
Security Council that the unwillingness of the United States to
process Venezuela’s request for the extradition of Posada
Carriles shows that the United States has a double standard in
the war on terror); Wilfredo Cancio Isla, Exigen la Extradicion
de Posada a Venezuela, El Nuevo Herald (Miami), Jan. 26, 2006,
at A, available at 2006 WLNR 1393920 (alleging that the DOJ is
just following orders from George W. Bush, who wants to treat
the case of Posada Carriles as a simple immigration case).
12

See Albornoz supra note 8 (reporting that on November 9 the

Department of State sent the Venezuelan embassy a diplomatic
note stating that it would soon send questions and concerns
regarding the extradition of Posada Carriles, but that as of
January 24, 2006, the embassy had received nothing); Cancio
Isla, supra note 11 (quoting Venezuela’s lawyer in Washington
accusing the United States of proteting a terrorist); Bruce
Zagaris, U.S. Court Bars Deportation of Terrorist Suspect to
Cuba or Venezuela, Int’l Enforcement L. Rep., Dec. 2005, at
Extradition (indicating that the United States and Venezuela are
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in a rhetoric battle on counter-terrorism cooperation in the
case of Posada Carriles).
13

See Madeline Baro Diaz, Vanessa Bauza and Ruth Morris, U.S.

Arrests Suspect in Terror Attacks on Cuban Plane, Hotels, Sun
Sentinel (Fort. Lauderdale), May 18, 2005 (asserting that DHS
agents arrested Posada Carriles after he withdrew a petition for
asylum in the United States and was preparing to leave the
country).

See also In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-

419-708, U.S. Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 1,
available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (indicating that the immigration court has
subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of Posada Carriles’
presence in the United States).
14

See In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-708, U.S.

Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 1-2, available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (noting that Posada Carriles first denied
his deportability alleging that he never gave up his status as a
permanent resident in the United States, but subsequently
conceded that he lost his permanent residency when he became a
Venezuelan citizen).

Posada Carriles later conceded his

ineligibility for withholding of removal based on his serious

29

nonpolitical criminal convictions outside the United States.
Id. at 2.
15

See id. at 6-7 (finding that in consideration of the strong

cultural, political, and economic ties between Venezuela and
Cuba, it was plausible that Venezuela would allow Cuban agents
to interrogate and torture Posada Carriles in Venezuela).
16

See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. III, April 18, 1988, S.
Treaty Doc. 100-20, 23 I.L.M 1027 (providing that an inquiry
into the possibility of torture in the country of deportation or
extradition must take into account the existence in that country
of a consistent pattern of human rights violations).

See also

Deferral of Removal under the Convention against Torture, 8
C.F.R. § 1208.17 (2005) (codifying article III of the Convention
against Torture).
17

See In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-708, U.S.

Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 5, available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (observing that even terrorists or mass
murderers qualify for deferral of removal if they prove that
more likely than note they would suffer torture if deported).
18

See U.S. Considering Moving Anti-Castro Activist to Third

Country, Voice of Am., Jan. 25, 2006, available at WL 1422757
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(noting that Posada Carriles’ attorney is seeking his
provisional release while the DHS Office of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement looks for a third country where to deport
Posada Carriles).
19

See discussion infra Part II (introducing the provisions of

the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions and the United
States law and procedure that deal with the investigation of
terrorists and the means to extradite or prosecute terror
suspects).
20

See discussion infra Part III (a) (contending that the

Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions apply to the case of
Posada Carriles even though the attack against the Cuban
airplane took place before these conventions became enforceable
between the United States and Venezuela).
21

See discussion infra Part III (b) (arguing that the language

of the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions, interpreted
in light of the objectives of the conventions and the
obligations that the United States and Venezuela undertook in
the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, supports the
conclusion that the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions
impose on the United States a duty to investigate and report
expeditiously in the case of Posada Carriles).
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22

See discussion infra Part III (c) (contending that the removal

proceedings against Posada Carriles did not involve an inquiry
into Venezuela’s allegations and therefore does not constitute
the type of investigation that the Montreal and Terrorist
Bombings conventions require).
23

See discussion infra Part III (d) (contending that the failure

to act on Venezuela’s extradition request despite the
possibility that the DHS may at any time deport Posada Carriles
to a country other than Venezuela or Cuba puts the United States
in violation of the duty to conduct an expeditious investigation
and make a prompt report).
24

See discussion infra Part IV (a) (suggesting that the OIA

should promptly undertake to process Venezuela’s extradition
request and that the DOJ or the Department of State should
promptly communicate with Venezuela and assure this country that
the OIA is investigating the allegations raised in the
extradition request).
25

See discussion infra Part IV (b) (arguing that if the DHS

deports Posada Carriles in the absence of an investigation and
finding that Venezuela’s charges lack merit, the United States
will be in violation of
26

the duty to extradite or prosecute).

See discussion infra Part IV (recommending that the United

States implement legislation to require the OIA to process
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extradition requests expeditiously when the requesting state
invokes the Montreal Convention or the Terrorist Bombings
Convention as basis for the extradition).
27

See discussion infra Part V (predicting that unless the United

States promptly undertakes to process Venezuela’s extradition
request, the case of Posada Carriles will undermine the
credibility of the United States in the war on terror and
negatively affect the international community’s willingness to
act together to fight terrorism).
28

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1 (listing the United

States and Venezuela as signatories); United Nations Office On
Drugs and Crime, Chapter Four: Montreal Convention, at 95,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Commonwealth_Chapter_4.
pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing that the United States
and Venezuela ratified the Montreal Convention on November 1,
1972, and November 21, 1983, respectively); United Nations
Treaty Collection, International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings,
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing
that the United States and Venezuela ratified the Terrorist
Bombings Convention on June 26, 2002, and September 23, 2003,
respectively).

33

29

See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Chapter Four:

Montreal Convention, at 90, 95,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Commonwealth_Chapter_4.
pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing that the Montreal
Convention entered into force on January 26, 1973, with the
United States among the states that had already ratified the
convention, but Venezuela did not ratify the convention until
November of 1983).
30

See United Nations Treaty Collection, International Convention

for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing
that the Terrorist Bombings Convention entered into force on May
23, 2001, but the United States and Venezuela did not ratify the
convention until June 26, 2002, and September 23, 2003,
respectively).
31

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. I and IV (making

the provisions of the convention applicable to all unlawful
attacks against civil aircrafts in flight except when the
aircrafts performs a military, customs or police service)
32

Compare id. (covering only attacks against civil aircrafts in

flight) with Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art.
II and III (covering acts of violence against the public or in

34

public places generally, including attacks against public
transportation instrumentalities and conveyances).

See W.

Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism,
Hous. J. Int’l L., Fall 1999, at 3, 27 (proposing that the
Terrorist Bombings Convention is different from previous
counter-terrorism conventions in that it criminalizes a
terrorist technique rather than specific terrorist acts).
33

See Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. I, ¶ 6

(establishing that the phrase “public transportation systems”
covers all facilities, conveyances and instrumentalities,
whether publicly or privately owned, used to deliver
transportation services to the public).
34

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. V, ¶ 2 (directing

states to establish jurisdiction over the offender when they do
not extradite him to another state with jurisdiction under the
convention to prosecute the offender); Terrorist Bombings
Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶ 4 (same).
35

Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2

(requiring a preliminary inquiry into the facts when a state,
upon receiving information that an alleged offender is in its
territory, takes the suspect into custody) with Terrorist
Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2 and 6
(requiring states to conduct an investigation of the facts upon

35

receiving information that an alleged offender is in their
territory whether or not they detain the suspect).
36

Compare Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. IX

(requiring states to consider the provisions of any extradition
treaty or other agreement among them to be modified to the
extent that they are incompatible with the convention) with
Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (lacking an
equivalent provision).
37

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (providing

that states which make extradition conditional on the existence
of an extradition treaty may consider the convention as legal
grounds for extradition in cases where they receive an
extradition request from a state with which they do not have an
extradition treaty); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note
1, art. IX (directing states to consider, if necessary, any
covered offence to have taken place not only where the offence
actually occurred but also in the territory of parties with
jurisdiction under the convention).
38

Compare Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art.

VIII, ¶ 2 (providing that in cases where the requested state
only extradites its nationals subject to a condition that the
requesting state will return them to serve their sentences in
the requested state, such an arrangements will satisfy the

36

requested state’s duty to extradite or prosecute) with Montreal
Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (lacking a similar
provision).
39

Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. XI (stating

that the law of the state which receives a request for
assistance applies in all circumstances) with Terrorist Bombings
Convention, supra note 1, art. X (directing states to provide
one another assistance in conformity with any mutual legal
assistance treaties or arrangements existing among them or, in
cases where no such treaties or arrangements exist, in
accordance with their domestic law).
40

See Organization of American States, Department of

International Legal Affairs, A-66: Inter-American Convention
against Terrorism,
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.or
g/DIL/treaties_and_agreements.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006)
(showing the United States and Venezuela as parties to the
convention).
41

See id. (showing that the Inter-American Convention entered

into force on July 10, 2003, and Venezuela and the United States
ratified the convention on October 22, 2003, and November 2,
2005, respectively).

37

42

See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. II, ¶ 1(b)

and ¶ 1(i) (stating that offences under the Montreal Convention
and Terrorist Bombings Convention, among other counter-terrorism
instruments, are also offences under the Inter-American
Convention).

States parties must afford one another expeditious

assistance in conformity with applicable international
agreements in force among them or, in the absence of such
agreements, in accordance with their domestic law.

Id., art.

IX.
43

See 18 U.S.C.S. § 32 (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing

jurisdiction over offences under the Montreal Convention when
they occur outside the United States against a foreignregistered aircraft if the offender is a national of the United
States or is found in the United States, or if a national of the
United States was or would have been on board the targeted
aircraft); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332f (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing
jurisdiction over offences under the Terrorist Bombings
Convention which take place outside the United States when the
perpetrator is found in the United States).
44

See United States v. Lei Shi, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135-36

(D. Haw. 2003), recons. denied, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Haw.
2005) (stating that under the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, an

38

international instrument similar to the Montreal and Terrorist
Bombings conventions, the United States has discretion whether
to extradite an offender or prosecute him in domestic courts).
45

See Lei Shi, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-36 (commenting that the

United States could extradite the offender to China, his country
of nationality, or the Republic of Seychelles, where the ship
that the offender attacked was registered, but the United States
could also exercise jurisdiction and prosecute the offender in
its domestic courts).
46

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual

[hereinafter USAM] 9-612 (1997) (stating that all United States
extradition treaties require states to submit their extradition
requests to the Department of State).
47

See id. (indicating that the Department of State also examines

the extradition request to identify potential foreign policy
implications).
48

See id. (explaining that if the extradition request is in

proper order, the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department
of State forwards it to the OIA along with a certificate
attesting to the existence of a treaty and the propriety of the
request).

39

49

See id., 9-613 (indicating that the OIA also conducts a second

check to make sure that the request satisfies all the pertinent
formalities).
50

See id. (stating that the OIA, after evaluating the evidence

supporting the allegations in the extradition request, forwards
the request to the United States attorney in the district where
the person subject to the request is present for the purpose of
initiating extradition proceedings before a magistrate).

The

OIA advises prosecutors at every stage of the extradition
process.
51

Id.

See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3184 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that, upon

a finding that the evidence is sufficient to support the charges
against the person subject to extradition, the magistrate may
issue a warrant for the arrest of such person if the person is
not yet in custody).

See also Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100,

1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the duties of the magistrate
judge in extradition matters and noting that, in addition to
conducting a probable cause inquiry, the magistrate must assess
whether any provisions of the instrument on which the requesting
state bases the extradition request effectively bar the
extradition).

40

52

See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3184 (indicating that the magistrate

forwards the certificate of extraditability to the Department of
State along with a copy of the testimony given in the case).
53

See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3184 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that the

Department of State may deliver the extraditable person to the
requesting country); Barapind, 225 F.3d at 1105 (explaining that
the Secretary of State, out of humanitarian or other
considerations, may refuse to extradite a person otherwise
extraditable).

Barapind further explains that in some cases,

particularly those where extradition would violate the
Convention against Torture, the courts may review a Secretary of
State’s decision to extradite).

Id. at 1106.

Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition:

See generally M.
United States Law

and Practice Ch. IX (4th ed., Oceana Publications Inc. 2002)
(providing an in depth description and analysis of United States
extradition procedures).
54

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI (requiring no

specific methods or channels for countries to raise allegations
that a terrorist is present in the territory of a state party to
the convention); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1,
arts. VII and XV (requiring states to cooperate in the
prevention of terrorism by exchanging information whenever
possible concerning the presence of terrorists or terrorist

41

organizations in their territories, but making no specifications
about the methods or channels of communication that states
should use in carrying out this obligation).

See also Inter-

American Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (mandating states
to establish and enhance channels of communication to facilitate
expeditious exchange of information concerning offences under
the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions among other
instruments).
55

See 50 U.S.C.S. § 403-5d (LexisNexis 2006) (authorizing the

transfer of foreign intelligence information to different
domestic agencies for the purpose of investigating threats of
terrorism).
56

See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (indicating that the OIA

reviews the evidence submitted with the extradition request to
determine whether it supports probable cause to believe that the
facts alleged in the request constitute an extraditable offence
and the person sought in extradition committed the offence).
See also Ethal A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States
Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive
Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 813, 818-20 (1993)
(examining the formation and development of the OIA as the
central office dealing with extradition and other international
law matters); Bassiouni, supra note 53, at 760 (observing that

42

the OIA deals with all issues of cooperation in criminal matters
among states).
57

See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (noting that the OIA

investigates and evaluates the evidence submitted in support of
a request for extradition and acts on the weight and credibility
of the evidence).
58

See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) (imposing

no time requirements on the OIA concerning the processing of
extradition requests); USAM, supra note 51, 9-602-22 (same).
59

See 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006); USAM, supra note 51,

9-602-22.
60

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, arts. I and IV, ¶¶ 2-3

(making the provisions of the convention applicable in all
situations where the offender is in a state other than the state
of registration of the aircraft or the state where the offence
takes place).
61

See id., pmbl. (announcing that the purpose of the convention

is to facilitate appropriate measures for the punishments of
those who commit unlawful acts of violence against civil
aircrafts or passengers within).

See also Joyner, supra note 1,

at 513 (explaining that during the 1960s the threat of
terrorists targeting international flights became a serious
concern to the members of the International Civil Aviation

43

Organization, and this concern prompted the negotiation and
drafting of the Montreal Convention); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Aviation Security:

The Role of Law in the War against

Terrorism, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 649, 651-57 (reviewing the
history of hijackings and other violent attacks against civil
aircrafts that gave birth to the Montreal Convention and its
predecessor the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft).
62

See Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. II

(criminalizing violent attacks against public transportation
systems).

The Terrorist Bombings Convention provides a

comprehensive legal framework covering terrorist acts that
already constitute offences under other counter-terrorism
conventions.

Id., pmbl.

63

Id., art. II.

64

Id., art. I, ¶ 6.

65

See Perez v. United States,

402 U.S. 146, 1150 (1971)

(mentioning aircrafts as instrumentalities of interstate
commerce); Tom Lyons, This Terrorist Suspect Has Much Reason to
Feel Welcome in Florida, Sarasota Herald-Trib., May 19, 2005, at
B (noting that the Cuban civil airplane that exploded over
Barbados in 1976 was bringing home young Cuban athletes).

44

66

See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Chapter Four:

Montreal Convention, at 90, 95,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Commonwealth_Chapter_4.
pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing that the Montreal
Convention entered into force between the United States and
Venezuela in November of 1983); United Nations Treaty
Collection, International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings,
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing
that the Terrorist Bombings Convention entered into force
between the United States and Venezuela on September 23, 2003);
discussion infra Part III (a) (arguing that because extradition
treaties generally apply retroactively and the Montreal and
Terrorist Bombings conventions focus on extradition as a tool to
bring terrorists to justice, the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings
conventions apply to offences that took place before the
conventions entered into force).
67

See Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955, 956 (2d. Cir. 1927)

(stating that extradition treaties apply to offences that take
place prior to the treaty’s entry into force in the absence of a
provision to the contrary); In the Matter of the Extradition of
Othmar Ernst, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 710, at *38 (D. S.D.N.Y.
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1998) (commenting that for more than a century the law has been
that extradition treaties can be enacted or modified with
retroactive effect).
68

See Reisman supra, note 32, at 22, 28 (proposing that the

Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings Convention are
primarily extradition and judicial assistance treaties).
69

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, arts. VII and VIII

(establishing a duty to extradite or prosecute and providing
that states can rely upon the convention as legal basis for
extradition among themselves); Terrorist Bombings Convention,
supra note 1, arts. XIII and IX (same).

See also Joyner, supra

note 1, at 502 (observing that in nearly all of the counterterrorism conventions, extradition takes the central role in law
enforcement).
70

Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII, ¶ 1; Terrorist

Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. IX, ¶ 1.
71

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2

(mandating states immediately to make a preliminary inquiry into
the facts when they take an alleged offender into custody);
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1,2
and 6 (requiring states parties to conduct an investigation of
the facts upon receiving information that an alleged offender is
in their territory even if they do not detain the suspect).
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72

See Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955, 956 (2d. Cir. 1927)

(noting that extradition treaties apply retroactively in the
absence of a provision to the contrary); In the Matter of the
Extradition of Othmar Ernst, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 710, at *38
(D. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (commenting states can conclude or modify
extradition treaties with retroactive effect).

See generally

Montreal Convention, supra note 1, arts. VII and VIII (giving
extradition a central role in bringing terrorists to justice);
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII and IX
(same).

See also Reisman supra, note 32, at 22, 28 (proposing

that the Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings
Convention focus primarily on extradition); Joyner, supra note
1, at 502 (observing that extradition is central to all of the
counter-terrorism conventions).
73

See Convention on the Law of Treaties, [hereinafter Vienna

Convention], art. XXXI, Jul. 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (establishing
that for the purpose of interpretation of treaties, the context
of a treaty comprises the text, including its preamble and
annexes, and any agreements which the parties made in connection
with the treaty).
74

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (speaking of an

urgent need for effective measures to punish terrorists in order
to deter future terrorist attacks); Terrorist Bombings
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Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasizing the need for a
comprehensive legal framework which will enhance cooperation
among states in the prevention and punishment of terrorists).
See also Joyner, supra note 1, at 539 (commenting that the end
goal of the counter-terrorism conventions is the apprehension,
prosecution and punishment of terrorists); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Aviation Security:

The Role of Law in the War Against

Terrorism, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 649, 732 (2003) (observing
that the counter-terrorism conventions’ reduction of the number
of potential safe havens for terrorists appears to have
contributed to a decline of aerial terrorism).
75

See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, arts. II (b), II

(i), and IX (requiring states to provide one another “the
greatest measure of expeditious mutual legal assistance” in
connection with the investigation and prosecution of offences
under the Montreal Convention and Terrorist Bombings Convention
among other counter-terrorism instruments).
76

See discussion infra Part III (b) (arguing that the language

of the conventions, when analyzed in light of the objective to
deter terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice and the
obligation of the United States and Venezuela under the InterAmerican Convention to afford one another expeditious
assistance, supports the interpretation that the duty to

48

investigate and report requires the United States to investigate
and report in an expeditious manner).
77

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (expressing a

need to punish terrorists to deter future terrorist attacks);
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (calling for
the enhancement inter-state cooperation in the prevention and
punishment of terrorists).

See also Joyner, supra note 1, at

539 (noting that the goal of the counter-terrorism conventions
is the apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists);
Barry Kellman and David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear
Window:

A Legal Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U.

Ill. L. Rev. 667, 730 (1996) (suggesting that the goal of the
duty to extradite or prosecute of the counter-terrorism
conventions is to eliminate safe havens for terrorists);
Dempsey, supra note 66, at 732 (observing that the counterterrorism conventions’ reduction of the number of potential safe
havens for terrorists appears to have contributed to a decline
in aerial terrorism).
78

See Kellman and Gualtieri, supra note 82, at 730 (explaining

that the duty to extradite or prosecute of the counter-terrorism
conventions seek to eliminate safe havens for terrorists);
Grant, supra note 2, at 458 (suggesting that unless states
undertake to prosecute or extradite in good faith, the

49

prosecute-or-extradite formula fails to accomplish its objective
of bringing offenders to justice); Joyner, supra note 1, at 53940 (proposing that the critical ingredient for the success of
the anti-terrorism regime is political will to convert
international obligations into practice).
79

See Unwelcome Visitor, supra note 6 (suggesting that failure

to investigate Venezuela’s allegations and either prosecute or
extradite Posada Carriles will make a mockery of the United
States’ stance on terrorism and seriously jeopardize America’s
credibility); Curt Anderson, supra note 6 (proposing that Posada
Carriles’ presence in the United States threatens to undermine
the credibility of American foreign policy in the war on
terror).
80

See text accompanying note 4 (suggesting that failure to

prosecute or extradite terror suspects will undermine the
effectiveness of the international anti-terrorism regime).
81

See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, arts. II (b), II

(i), and IX (providing that states must carry out the obligation
to afford one another expeditious assistance in accordance with
mutual assistance agreements in force between them, or in
accordance with their domestic laws when no such agreements
exist).

50

82

Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. IX; Vienna

Convention, supra note 79, art. XXXI, ¶ 3 (c).

See Oil

Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. LEXIS 11, 49-50 (Nov. 6,
2003) (deciding that the application of relevant rules of
international law in force between the parties to the dispute
constitute an integral part of the International Court of
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al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
109/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II/106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 40 (1999) (citing
article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention as support for a the
proposition that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
interprets international instruments in light of the
international legal system in force at the time of the
interpretation).
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Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. IX.

84

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI (directly

states to “immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the
facts” when they suspect the presence of a terrorist in their
territory).
85

See id. (mandating the state where the alleged terrorist is in

custody to notify other states with jurisdiction over him of the
alleged terrorist’s arrest and the reasons for his detention).
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investigation communicate to other states parties with
jurisdiction over the suspect whether or not it will exercise
jurisdiction).
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See id. (providing also that custody of the alleged terrorist

may continue only for such time as is necessary to initiate
criminal or extradition proceedings against him).

See also

Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992
I.C.J. 114, 122-23 (Apr. 14, 1992) (noting that after a grand
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promptly and in full all that it knows about the downing of the
aircraft); S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992)
(urging Libya to comply immediately with the United States and
the United Kingdom’s request to investigate and disclose
promptly the circumstances of the Lockerbie terrorist attack).
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Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI; Inter-American

Convention, supra note 1, art. IX.
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Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶ 1.
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Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI (using the

adverb “immediately” to qualify the action that states must
take) with Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art.
VII, ¶ 1 (lacking a similar qualifier).
91

See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) (containing

no duty to investigate expeditiously or within any specified
time period); USAM, supra note 51, 9-602-22 (same).
92

See text accompanying note 79 (explaining that the objective

of the Terrorist Bombings Convention is to deter acts of
terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice).
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Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII; Inter-

American Convention, supra note 1, art. IX.
94

Compare Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII,

¶ 6 (“The State which makes the investigation...shall promptly
inform” other states parties with possible jurisdiction over the
suspect of the results of the investigation) with Montreal
Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶ 4 (“The State which makes
the preliminary inquiry...shall promptly report its findings” to
other states parties with possible jurisdiction over the
suspect).
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See Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶ 6

(requiring also that the state conducting the inquiry indicate
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to other states with jurisdiction over the suspect whether or
not it intends to exercise jurisdiction).
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Id.
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See generally In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-

708, U.S. Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005), available
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (addressing only the issue whether Posada
Carriles more likely than not would suffer torture if deported
to Venezuela).

The court did not inquire into Venezuela’s

allegations that Posada Carriles masterminded the 1976 Cuban
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Id.

See id. (analyzing only the credibility of the testimonies

about the likelihood that Posada Carriles would suffer torture
if deported to Venezuela).
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See id. at 3 (showing that the DHS presented no evidence of

any kind in the deferral of removal hearing); Montreal
Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2 (requiring states
to make a preliminary inquiry into the facts upon receiving
information that an alleged offender is in their territory);
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2
and 6 (requiring states to investigate any information that an
alleged terrorist is in their territory).
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See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006)

(containing no provision which indicates that a decision of an
immigration court is binding upon the State Department or the
DOJ in extradition proceedings); USAM, supra note 51, 9-602-22
(same).

See also Bassiouni, supra note 61, at 174 (commenting

that a finding of political persecution by immigration
authorities has no binding effect on extradition proceedings,
and a similar decision by an extradition magistrate has no
binding effect on deportation or asylum proceedings).
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See Bassiouni, supra note 61, at 174 (criticizing the fact

that asylum proceedings, including withholding of removal, and
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out that even though deportation proceedings have no binding
effect on am extradition magistrate’s decision that a person is
extraditable and vice versa, a finding by immigration
authorities that an alien would face persecution if deported
binds the executive in the final decision whether to extradite
such alien to the country where he would face persecution. Id.
at 174-75.
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See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (indicating that the OIA

reviews the evidence submitted with the extradition request to
determine whether it supports probable cause to believe that the
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facts alleged in the request constitute an extraditable offence
and the person sought in extradition committed the offence).
See also Nadelmann, supra note 56, at 818-20 (examining the
formation and development of the OIA as the central office
dealing with extradition and other international law matters);
Bassiouni, supra note 53, at 760 (observing that the OIA deals
with all issues of cooperation in criminal matters among
states).
103

See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) (imposing

no time requirements on the OIA regarding the processing of
extradition requests); USAM, supra note 51, 9-602-22 (same);
discussion infra Part III (d) (contending that because the DHS
may deport Posada Carriles to a country other than Venezuela or
Cuba at any time, the OIA’s timing in investigating the
allegations that Venezuela raised in the extradition request is
at odds with the obligation to investigate and report in an
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104

See U.S. Seeks a Country That Will Take Cuban, Belleville

News Democrat, Mar. 23, 2006, at A (reporting that Posada
Carriles will remain in immigration detention while efforts to
send him to a third country continue); Venezuela Reclama a EEUU
Extradicion del “Bin Laden Latinoamericano”, supra note 10
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(quoting the Venezuelan ambassador alleging that the OIA is
ignoring the extradition request).
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See 18 U.S.C.S. § 32(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing

jurisdiction over offences under the Montreal Convention when
the offender is found in the United States); 18 U.S.C.S. §
2332f(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing jurisdiction over
offences under the Terrorist Bombings Convention when the
perpetrator is found in the United States); In the Matter of
Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-708, U.S. Immigr. Ct., El Paso,
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http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (mentioning no connection between the 1976
plane bombing and the United States other than the alleged
perpetrator’s presence in the United States).
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Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶ 4
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See U.S. Seeks a Country That Will Take Cuban, supra note 109

(reporting that the DHS may soon deport Posada Carriles).
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See Grant, supra note 2 (suggesting that the duty to

investigate is a necessary ingredient of the duty to extradite
or prosecute); text accompanying note 82 (commenting that the
objective of the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions is
to prevent and deter terrorism by bringing terrorists to
justice).
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See U.S. Seeks a Country That Will Take Cuban, supra note 109

(indicating Posada Carriles may soon not be present in the
United States); Venezuelan Diplomat Calls on U.S. to Extradite
Cuban Militant, supra note 113 (noting that Venezuela is still
unsuccessfully calling for Posada Carriles’ extradition).
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also discussion supra Part III (b) (contending that unless
states undertake to investigate expeditiously allegations that a
terrorist is in their territory, they will fail to achieve the
objective of the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions of
bringing terrorists to justice).
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See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2

(creating a duty to investigate allegations that a terrorist is
present in the territory of a state party); Terrorist Bombings
Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2 and 6 (same).
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also discussion supra Part III (d) (arguing that the United

58

States is in violation of the duty to investigate and report);
discussion infra Part IV (b) (contending that unless the United
States takes prompt action to investigate Venezuela’s
allegations and report the findings, the United States will also
be in violation of the duty to extradite or prosecute).
110

See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (indicating that the OIA

reviews extradition requests to determine whether they support
probable cause and then decides whether to bring extradition
proceedings before a federal magistrate); Venezuela Reclama a
EEUU Extradicion del “Bin Laden Latinoamericano”, supra note 10
(reporting that Venezuela alleges that the OIA is ignoring the
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See text accompanying note 12 (reporting Venezuela’s

complaint that the Department of State has failed to communicate
with Venezuela regarding the extradition request).
112

See discussion infra Part IV (b) (proposing that if the DHS

deports Posada Carriles to a third country without a decision by
the OIA that the charges against him lack evidentiary support,
the United States would have let an alleged terrorist go free,
thus violating the duty to extradite or prosecute).
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See discussion infra Part IV (c) (arguing that the United

States should codify the duty to investigate and report to avoid
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being in violation of this international obligation in the
future).
114

See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (stating that the OIA examines

the evidence submitted with an extradition request to determine
whether it supports probable cause to believe that the person
sought in extradition committed the offence for which he is
wanted).
115

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2

(imposing a duty on states to investigate allegations that a
terrorist is present in their territory); Terrorist Bombings
Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2 and 6 (same).
116

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 3 and 4

(imposing several obligations on states parties to communicate
with one another regarding the investigation of terrorists);
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2
and 6 (same).

See also Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art.

X (requiring states to afford one another the greatest degree of
cooperation); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art.
X (same).
117

See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 3 and 4

(imposing an obligation on states parties to report the results
of their investigations); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra
note 1, art. VII, ¶ 6 (same).
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See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3184 (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring a finding

of probable cause by a magistrate before the Department of State
may surrender any person in extradition).
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Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI; Terrorist

Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII.
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See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (obliging the

state party where the alleged terrorist is present to extradite
or prosecute the alleged terrorist); Terrorist Bombings
Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (same); discussion infra
Part IV (b) (arguing that if the DHS

deports Posada Carriles

without a decision by the OIA that the charges against him are
unfounded, the United States would have let an alleged terrorist
go free, thus violating the duty to extradite or prosecute)
121

See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (indicating that the OIA

examines the evidence submitted in support of extradition
requests and draws conclusions about their weight and
credibility).
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See text accompanying note 2 (proposing that the goal of the

duty to extradite or prosecute is to bring terrorists to
justice).
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See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (requiring

the state party where the alleged terrorist is present to
extradite or prosecute the alleged terrorist); Terrorist
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Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (same); text
accompanying note 2 (proposing that the goal of the duty to
extradite or prosecute is to bring terrorists to justice).
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See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006)

(containing no provisions requiring the OIA to process
extradition requests within a specified period of time); USAM,
supra note 51, 9-602-22 (same).
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See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006)

(containing no provisions requiring the OIA to inform the
requesting state of the results of the investigation of the
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note 51, 9-602-22 (same).
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See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI
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See also discussion supra
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See discussion supra Part III (d) (contending that the OIA

has unnecessarily delayed the investigation of Venezuela’s
allegations against Posada Carriles).
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See text accompanying note 4 (explaining that unless

countries show political will to bring terrorists to justice,
the international counter-terrorism regime fails as a legal tool
to bring states together in the war on terror); text
accompanying note 6 (suggesting that the Posada Carriles case
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lack of action in the Posada Carriles case despite ongoing
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See text accompanying note 5 (expressing fear that states may
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